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INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND ENERGY
TAXATION
JOHN

A.

CARVER, JR.*

An evaluation of the impact of taxation on energy markets has to be
concerned with the federal system, under which the federal sovereignty and
the state sovereignties' each adopt their own taxing philosophies and taxing
structures. Since there are not fifty different statewide energy markets, and
since political tradition and legal precedent favor continuance of the existing
arrangement, it is desirable to illustrate how the system works in selected
situations. An effective analysis of national energy policies requires an understanding of energy taxation.
This article will examine those constitutional provisions limiting taxing
power as well as those which furnish a basis for federal preemption or federal
dominance. 2 Additionally, it will consider the "in-lieu-of-tax" aspects of
*

Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Of Counsel, Head, Moye,

Carver & Raye, Denver, Colorado. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Juliann
Sitoski whose work on this article has been invaluable.
A version of this paper was prepared for the Committee on Energy Taxation of the National Research Council. The views expressed are those of the author, however, and should not
be interpreted to represent the views of the Committee, the National Research Council, or the
National Academy of Sciences.
1. This classification includes the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories.
2. The federal government's power to tax is derived from art. I,§ 8, cl.I of the United
States Constitution, which confers on Congress the power to tax. In commenting on the scope
of this power, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Chase, remarked: -[Tlhe
power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one
exception, and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct
taxes by the rule of apportionment [U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.3 and § 9, cl.4] and indirect
taxes by the rule of uniformity [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1].Thus limited, and thus only, it
reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
462, 471 (1866).
State limitations on the power to tax are more circumscribed. Since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the Supreme Court held that a state could not tax a
federal bank, the well-established rule, based on the Supremacy Clause, has been that a state
cannot levy a property tax on federal property. See, e.g., Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151 (1886). An exception to this rule arises if Congress expressly permits such taxation. Id. at
175.
It was not until 1871, however, that state immunity from federal taxation was recognized
in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1871) (holding that the salary of a state judge was
immune from the national income tax). Under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity,
first enunciated in McCulloch, limitations are imposed upon both the federal and state governments with respect to their power to tax each other. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
A further limitation on state taxing power is found under the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3, which vests Congress with the exclusive power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923). No state may levy
a tax which imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 596. State taxing
power is also limited under the Import-Export Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2, which
specifies that no state can levy any imports or duties on imports or exports without congressional
approval, unless it is absolutely necessary to carry out the state's inspection laws. In regard to
sales taxes, Congress, by statute, can prohibit the states from levying sales taxes on the federal
government. Carson v. Roan-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952). This power is not dependent
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provisions for the sharing of revenues from energy mineral production. The
tax-like effects of federal and state mineral leasing policies are also treated in
this article, as are seemingly remote relationships which affect energy markets in a tax-like way, such as utility regulatory policies, state water laws,
and federal programs for regional development. The effect of state mineral
taxing policies upon mineral production and energy resource development is
also a subject of discussion. And, finally, brief attention is given to the forces
encouraging states to conform their administration and compliance systems
to those of the federal government to facilitate collection and enforcement.
I.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

IntergovernmentalImmunity

Both the states and the federal government own property or operate
enterprises which, if owned or operated privately, would be subject to the
taxing power of the other sovereignty. The property may consist of energy
minerals reserved by the governmental body upon sale of the surface estate,
or it may consist of real property owned by the governmental body, which
contains energy minerals. 3 Similarly, the states and the federal government
engage independently in various energy-related activities. States either authorize their municipal corporations to engage in the generation, distribution, and sale of electricity or natural gas, 4 or, by general legislation or
specific charter, they authorize municipal districts to perform such functions.
New York sells power through the Power Authority of the State of New
York; 5 Nebraska's entire electric utility system is a public system; 6 Washing7
ton has many municipal utility districts (Public Utility Districts or PUD's);
and Oregon has a comparable scheme.' The federal government has numerous government-owned and operated utility facilities on its military bases
on the nature of the activity exempted from taxation. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber
Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
3. Of the 2.2 billion acres of land within the United States, 755.3 million acres are owned
by the federal government. Preface to PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD
OF THE NATION'S LAND at x (1970). The federal government also holds reserved mineral interests in 62 million acres of land where the surface is in non-federal ownership. Id. at 137. It has
been customary for Congress to grant public lands to states for a variety of purposes. Beginning
with a grant to Ohio of one section of each township for schools, states created from public lands
have received grants of public lands consisting of one, two, and four sections of each township to
use for such purposes. The size of the grant depended upon the date of admission. Alaska, the
last state to join the union, was admitted with a gross grant of 102.5 million acres, which the
state was free to select. In addition to the school grants, generally held in trust, the typical
admission act provided for specific grants to assist in such purposes as building a capitol or a
penitentiary. See, e.g., Colorado Enabling Act, §§ 7-10, 1 COLO. REV. STAT. 43, 45-46 (1973),
which granted sections 16 and 36 for school purposes, 50 sections for public buildings, 50 sections for a penitentiary, and 72 sections for a university. Mineral lands were excepted, but this
depended on classification as of the date of selection, and the selected lands are in fact rich in
minerals. Texas is a special case, since its "public" land was that of a sovereign nation and was
retained by Texas upon admission. See note 80 infra.
4. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1 (1902, amended 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3132-105, -201(1) (1973).
5. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW. §§ 1000-1015 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 70-501 to -515, 70-601 to -680, & 70-801 to -808 (1976).
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 54.04 010-180 (1962 & Supp. 1978).
8. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 261.005-.730 (1977).
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and on some Indian reservations. 9 The Tennessee Valley Authority'" and
the Bonneville Power Administration'' are the best examples of federallyoperated energy facilities.
The generalized rule that a state cannot constitutionally levy a tax directly against the government of the United States and that the federal government cannot constitutionally levy a tax directly against the state' 2 does
not answer all questions. If Congress taps a source of revenue that is not
uniquely capable of being earned only by a state, the federal government
may constitutionally levy a tax although it incidentally affects a state.13 The
government may, of course, legislatively choose not to tax state activities it
constitutionally might tax.' 4 It is virtually impossible to find a federal activity not constitutionally immune from state taxation, but a state may employ
other indirect tactics to collect revenue. The situation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is instructive. Under its enabling statute, the TVA is
exempt from state taxation but is authorized to make payments in lieu of
taxes on its power facilities.' 5 It has acquired uranium reserves in Wyoming
but has been denied necessary operating permits by Wyoming unless it
agrees that its production may be taxed under the state's laws. The controversy seems about to be resolved by an agreement between the Chairman of
TVA and the Governor of Wyoming, which provides that the Authority will
take action, possibly by transfer of title to a trustee, to make its production
subject to Wyoming severance taxes. 16 Additionally, the states can and do
successfully levy taxes on the business activity of removing and selling minerals from lands leased from the federal government. These excise or severance
taxes are measured by the value of the minerals removed.' 7
There was a time, even after the passage of the sixteenth amendment in
1913, when the salaries of state officials and the income from state bonds
were deemed constitutionally protected from federal income taxes.' 8 The
continued exemption of municipal bond interest is probably not a constitu9. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2481(a), 3012(b)(4) (1976); 25 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1976).
11. Id. § 832. The Bonneville Power Administration is now administered by the Department of Energy under the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat.
965 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1978)). The Bonneville Power Administration was formerly administered by the Department of the Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 832(a)
(1976).
12. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946). For a discussion of the history of intergovernmental immunity from taxation, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
373-85 (1975); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAwv 367-70 (1978).
13. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
14. Id.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1976).
16. Interview with Deputy General Counsel, TVA (Apr. 15, 1980). The agreement between TVA and Wyoming, dated April 2, 1980, is on file in the governor's office in Cheyenne
and at TVA headquarters.
17. See, e.g., Montana coal severance tax, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111
(1979). Not only can states levy severance taxes for the removal of minerals, but the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that an Indian tribe can impose a severance tax on
nontribal members for the removal of oil and gas from the reservation. Merrion v. Jicarillo
Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
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tional requisite, but it is statutory19 as are many existing tax exemptions.
Being legislative creations, they are subject to elimination by statute.
Tax exemption and tax immunity are alike in their effects on energy
markets. Specific statutory exemptions, such as percentage depletion 20 or
expensing of intangible drilling costs, 2 1 are, however, definitionally easier to
22
change than those which are traditional but nonstatutory.
B.

The Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause

The Commerce Clause2 3 and the Equal Protection Clause 24 of the Constitution are the principal bases for attacks on state taxes which add to the
cost of producing, transporting, converting, or selling energy. 25 If there is no
statutory mandate or policy, the question of what does or does not burden
interstate commerce, or what is or is not equally protective of the rights of
citizens, is a matter for judicial consideration. 26 The courts have increasingly been called upon to resolve these constitutional issues.
Louisiana's First Use Tax2 7 is presently under attack in the Supreme
Court of the United States2 8 as an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. The tax is imposed on natural gas brought to shore in Louisiana
from the federal domain offshore and destined for markets beyond Louisiana, principally the northeastern industrial states. The impact of such a
tax-in this case, seven cents per thousand cubic feet- 2 9 would, under normal ratemaking practices of utility commissions, be passed on directly to
consumers. The challenge has been raised by a group of consuming states,
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has intervened as a party
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Montana recently rejected the contention of a
group of utility companies that Montana's thirty percent severance tax on
coal violated the Commerce Clause. 30 The Montana court also rejected the
contention that the tax was impermissible under the Supremacy Clause as
frustrating national policy 3 ' and particularly the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920.32 Still another comparable challenge to a state's energy tax re19.

I.R.C. § 103(a)(l).

20. Id. § 613.
21. Id. § 615 (repealed 1976).
22. See generally S. Blackstone, Mineral Severance Taxes in the Western States: An Economic and Legal Analysis of State Tax Policies (Nov. 26, 1979) (dissertation submitted to the
Colorado School of Mines).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 137-53.
26. For a discussion of the problems inherent in determining what constitutes a burden on
interstate commerce and a review of the Supreme Court's struggle to draw the line between a
permissible and impermissible state tax, see G. GUNTHER, Supra note 12, at 354-56.
27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-1307 (West Supp. 1979).
28. Maryland v. Louisiana, 47 U.S.L.W. 3813 (1979). The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has submitted an amicus curiae brief in this litigation. FERC also challenges the Louisiana tax.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1303(B) (West Supp. 1979).
30. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 14982 (Mont. July 17, 1980).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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ceived a different treatment by the United States Supreme Court. New
Mexico's Electrical Energy Tax 33 was levied on electrical energy exported
from the state. In lieu of resolving the constitutional controversy, the Court
held instead that Congress, in passing the Tax Reform Act of 1976, had
34
expressly forbidden the tax in question.
One recent severance tax has been declared unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce. 35 Ohio imposed a tax on the severance of coal
mined in the state. The tax rate increased as the sulphur content of the coal
decreased. 36 Because most Ohio coal is high in sulphur, the Ohio coal was
favored over competing low sulphur coal in the Ohio utility market. 37 Consequently, the severance tax was held to fall short of the evenhanded treat38
ment demanded by the Commerce Clause.
Connecticut has recently imposed a two percent tax on the sale of all
petroleum-based products distributed by companies with refining capabilities. 39 New York is considering a similar tax to help subsidize its mass transit
system. 40 A California proposition to levy a ten percent tax on the profits of
all energy companies except utilities was defeated in June. 4 Each of these
taxes will, in all probability, be challenged on equal protection or commerce
clause grounds by the entities affected.
II.

ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO TAX IMMUNITY AND TAX EXEMPTIONS:
"IN-LIEU-OF-TAX"

PROVISIONS

The federal government's dominating position as owner of land and underlying or reserved mineral resources has been considered burdensome by
the states. Therefore, numerous laws enacted since at least 1907 have required the federal government to share with the states proceeds realized
from the management or disposition of such resources. 4 2 These revenues displace the need to rely on the stock of private resources as the base for raising
revenues.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided that the land areas ceded by the
states then operating under the Articles of Confederation would be owned
by the national government. 43 The Ordinance created a capital stock which
helped to make the federal government viable. Further, it established a precedent so that when future states were created, the federal government
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18-3, 7-9-80(B)-(C) (1978).
34. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
35. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5751.02(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
37. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 474, 391 N.E.2d 716, 721

(1979).
38. Id. at 474, 391 N.E.2d at 721.
39. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1980, at 13, col. 1.
40. Id.
41. Proposition 11 was submitted to the voters on June 3, 1980.
42. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 235. For a breakdown of all
the programs and payments see 2 EBS MGMT. CONSULTANTS, INC., REVENUE SHARING AND
PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES ON THE PUBLIC LAND (1968).
43. Se, generaly P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 59-74 (1968).
The Land Ordinance of 1785 is reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 123-24 (7th

ed. H. Commager ed. 1963).
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would not automatically lose jurisdiction over its lands in the newly created
states.4 4 Additionally, the Property Clause 45 of the United States Constitution gave Congress a special role with respect to public domain lands by
vesting it with the exclusive right to control and dispose of such lands with46
out interference from the states.
This public land has caused an imbalance between the so-called public
land states and the rest of the nation. The attendant controversies sharply
divide the East and the West. 4 7 The East fought to get land grants in the
western territories to match those made to new states and was successful
when the Morrill Act was passed. 4 8 This Act gave scrip instead of land to
the eastern states for sale to third parties.4 9 The revenue produced was then
50
used to build agricultural and mechanical arts colleges.
Under the federal mineral leasing acts, fifty percent of the lease revenues derived by the federal government are paid to the states where the
minerals are located. 5 ' Congress has augmented this provision by a program
of in-lieu-of-taxes payments based upon the relative percentage of federal
lands in the states. Thus, the states benefit from national park, wildlife refuge, and non-commercial forest and forage acreages as well from the com52
mercial proceeds of mineral, forage, and timber disposition.
The nontaxable status of federal minerals is probably a part of the motivation for a program of federal loans to states and political subdivisions
designed to relieve social or economic impacts occasioned by the development of federal minerals in such states. 53 The loans are treated as advances
against the states' expected revenues from the federal sharing program for
the subsequent ten years; 54 they bear interest equivalent to the lowest interest rate paid on tax exempt bonds of the borrowing state within the preceding calendar year. 55 When the loan program was created in 1976, the
56
interest rate adopted was three percent per annum.
III.

LEASING POLICIES: ECONOMIC RENT

The federal government and the state governments can and do expect
part of their return from the disposition of energy minerals as rent. The
return is typically derived from a combination of land rentals at a fixed peracre basis, royalties at a fixed percentage rate, and lease bonuses received in
44. See generaly P. GATES, supra note 43, at 59-74.
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
46. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-43 (1976).
47. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 243-45.
48. P. GATES, supra note 43, at 22-23 (1968).
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id. For example, Cornell University traces its origin to one of these "land grants,"
which New York sold to the founder of the university.
51. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976).
52. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976).
53. 43 U.S.C. § 1747(1) (Supp. 1978).
54. Id. § 1747(2).
55. Id. § 1747(5).
56. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, tit. III,
§ 317(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2771 (1976).
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a competitive or auction system. 57 Variants include bidding on the royalty
which the bidder is willing to pay and sequential bidding. A complicating
factor is that the federal government operates (or was operating until a mor59
atorium was declared in February 1980)58 a lottery system for the disposition of acreage not classified within a known geologic structure of a
producing field. The lottery has been highly productive of revenue, independently of the ultimate productivity of the parcels offered. Additionally,
the tracts so disposed of are subject to the usual fixed rentals and fixed roy60
alty provisions.
6
The sheer volume of the federal government's mineral ownership '
makes the question of leasing policies extremely sensitive. The timing and
the form of sales tend to dictate the size of the bids. Spacing the sales too
62
Royclosely together tends to reduce the size of the bids, at least in theory.
alty bidding involves risks to the government which bureaucrats find diffi63
A front-end bonus
cult to justify if the leased acreage turns64out to be dry.
on a dry hole creates no such problem.
Policy considerations are numerous, and the choices are not easy to
make. For example, it is not completely clear that the government's policy is
or ought to be the maximization of the present value of the economic rent
derivable from government-owned minerals. 6 5 In the past, management
policies have been manipulated to keep the price of the federally-owned production down, thus tending to depress the price realized on the private or
state produced oil or gas. 66 However, the statute permitting production to
resume on acreage set apart in naval petroleum reserves provides for max67
imization of the government's return by an auction of the produced oil.
Recent sales of oil from naval petroleum reserves have yielded prices in ex68
cess of the OPEC prices.
A policy to maximize return to the federal government, given the sharing statutes referred to above, 69 might tend to enrich the states in which the
minerals are located. A particularly striking illustration of this enrichment is
57. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 223 (1976). See also PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 124.
58. Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3049, Feb. 29, 1980.
59. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1976); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3112.1-1 to .5-2 (1979).

60. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c)-(d) (1976).
61. The federal government's mineral ownership encompasses the mineral resources underlying the one-fourth of the land area of the United States administered by the Department of
the Interior, the resources beneath extensive areas of the public lands that are administered by
other federal agencies, and those underlying approximately 125,000 square miles of land in
private ownership. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINING AND MINERALS POLICY 3 (1979).
62.

See generally S.

MCDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS

PRODUCTION 77-81, 95-101 (1979).
63. IM. at 98-99.
64. Id. at 95-98.
65. For the view that the federal government has not adopted such policies but that it
should see S. MCDONALD, supra note 62, at 24-46.
66. In 1967, the Interior Department threatened to exclude federal leases from prorationing by state conservation authorities if the major oil companies did not roll back an increase in
gasoline prices. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 4.

67. 10 U.S.C. § 7430(b) (1976).
68. EN. L. SERV. (CCH) 4 (Feb. 7, 1980).
69. See notes 51-52 supra.
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found in the Minerals Leasing Act, which provides that Alaska may receive
70
ninety percent of the revenues from federal lease sales.
The federal government may dominate markets through ownership of
substantial shares of such natural resources as softwood timber or offshore oil
and gas. Not only market dominance, however, but land use, environmental, and other statutes affect energy prices in confusing and contradictory
ways. The Wilderness Act, 7t and various subsequent statutes7 2 authorize
withholding lands from mineral exploitation until their potential as wilderness areas has been evaluated. The Coastal Zone Management Act of
197273 can similarly affect energy markets by constraining port or conversion facilities. And, much mineral-rich land is "checkerboarded" as a result
of the railroad grant statutes,7 4 which gave the odd-numbered sections in
each township to the grantee and effectively blocked access to any public
land without permission from the "checkerboarded" private owner. 75 Conversely, the federal government has blocked much private development of
coal because the federal government has denied access to its "checker7
boarded" lands. 6
The states do not share in the proceeds of the most prolific oil and gas
producing area, the federal domain offshore. 77 It may be argued, however,
that the Submerged Lands Act, 78 in allotting to the states the three-mile or
three-league band (depending on the traditional legal regime in effect at
statehood) nearest the shore, put the coastal states in a favored position comparable to that enjoyed by the western states when they received land grants
upon achieving statehood. 79 Where the state patrimony is substantial, as,
for example, in state-owned areas offshore, in what would have been public
land if Texas had not enjoyed a period of sovereignty,8 0 and in Alaska,
which received a large land grant upon its admission to the Union,8 1 the
states can coordinate their leasing policies with their taxing policies. The
70. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976).
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)
(1976).
73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Pacific Railroad and Telegraph Line Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1862). See also
P. GATES, supra note 43, at 364-79.
75. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (review of the genesis of the
checkerboard pattern).
76. See Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1979), which held that the federal
government had condemned a privately reserved mineral estate by denying access. See also
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979) (condemnation of private property by
private oil company).
77. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 187-95. For a
discussion of the management of our federal offshore resources, see R. Krueger, Management of
Energy Resources on Federal Lands, 2 Energy Law Service §§ I IA.23-.33 (1978). For an analysis of
the 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, see Krueger & Singer, An
Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909
(1979).
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1976).
79. See note 3 supra.
80. See P. GATES, supra note 43, at 80-83.
81. Upon becoming a state, Alaska was granted 102,550,000 acres of public lands and
400,000 acres of national forest lands. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §§ 6a-6b, 72 Stat.
339 (1958).
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exemption of state royalty interests from the windfall profit tax 8 2 will have a
multi-billion dollar tax expenditure effect from the federal government to
83
several of the states.
It has been argued that leasing policies might well be different for coal,
which is abundant, and for oil and gas, which are not. 8 4 A conscious policy
of making coal available from federal lands at lesser royalty rates could create additional opportunities for states to increase severance taxes.
IV.

OTHER

RELATIONSHIPS WHIcH HAVE A TAx-LIKE EFFECT ON

ENERGY MARKETS

A.

Regionahism

The tax-exempt status of TVA and the Bonneville Power Administration has been previously mentioned. 85 The resource policies espoused in
these two laws were based on the use of natural or regional rather than
strictly political boundaries for the allocation of benefits. The pattern
started in 1902, when the Reclamation Act of 190286 created a reclamation
fund, which was initially earmarked for water projects in the states west of
the 100th meridian. This regional pattern was continued under the Minerals Leasing Act which directs that forty percent of the revenues received
from the disposition of public lands under this Act and under the Geothermal Steam Act of 197087 be deposited into the reclamation fund. 88
The federal purposes included a public ownership preference. The output of federally constructed hydroelectric projects was made preferentially
available to states, municipalities, and other public and cooperative bodies. 89 The resultant rates were "yardsticks" against which the investorowned competitors had to compete. A special kind of regional preference
developed when industries capable of adjusting their own loads to peaks in
the loads of the preference customers signed long-term contracts and made
huge investments in such energy-intensive industrial operations as aluminum
82. See I.R.C. § 4994(a). An equivalent exemption applies to Indian-owned oil. See id.
§ 4994(d).
83. Proposals were made during the debates on the windfall profit tax to make this oil
taxable.
84. For example, the oil and gas of the outer continental shelf is under exclusive federal
dominion, and the timing of leases is based upon a variety of considerations, the majority of
which appear to be aimed at maximizing the income to the federal government. Coal leasing,
on the other hand, is constrained by the checkerboard pattern of federal land ownership and the
relative abundance of non-federal coal. McDonald recommends increasing the rate of leasing
for offshore oil and gas but decreasing the rate of leasing federal coal to assure the receipt of a
fair market value for coal lands and also to assure the efficient development of the nation's total
coal deposits in the order of their rent-yielding capacity. See S. McDONALD, supra note 62, at
87-94.
85. See notes 10-16 supra and accompanying text.
86. Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902). The successor Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 391
(1976). See also Id. § 522 (1976).
87. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1976).
88. Id. § 191.
89. For such a preference in relicensing proceedings, see Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-825 (1976).
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smelting. This caused a major part of the nation's aluminum smelting industry to locate near the inexpensive power in the Pacific Northwest.
The demands of preference customers in the Bonneville Power Administration marketing area in the Pacific Northwest can no longer be met from
federal hydroelectric projects. The base loads now are increasingly being
met with nuclear and fossil-fired plants so that the hydro capacity can be
shifted to its more valuable peaking use. 90 As a result, the price gap between
the energy supplied by the government and that furnished from investorowned utilities, although still wide, is narrowing. Furthermore, a legislative
proposal sponsored by the congressional delegations from the region would
broaden the authority of the Bonneville Power Agency to contract with investor-owned utilities to supply bulk power to them from federal plants powered by fossil fuels and to issue bonds for this purpose. 91 The bill is widely
supported as a way of assuring the region a continued advantage in energy
prices.
Regionalism is the hallmark of the electric power system in this country.
The utility systems, both public and private, have formed a National Electric Reliability Council, which is composed of nine regional reliability councils. The system is principally autonomous, although the authority of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to order interconnections has been
expanded. 92 Physical interconnections are supplemented by contractual
agreements for the interchange of economy and emergency energy. With
one exception-that being in Texas-these pools and councils ignore state
boundaries. They permit reductions in costs and savings of petroleum fuels
by calling on the least costly power source first and disregarding the ownership of particular generating stations.
Problems exist, however. Wisconsin, for example, has ruled that out-ofstate utilities cannot own an interest in an in-state generating plant. 93 And,
California's public utilities commission has indicated that a California utility
desiring to construct a plant in another state would need, in addition to the
94
certificate in that state, a California license.
Another kind of regionalism is evident in the western section of the nation. There the energy producing states formed a loose association originally
known as the Western Interstate Nuclear Board. In September 1977, the
organization became the Western Interstate Energy Board. 95 As previously
90. See genera/'y BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NOTICE
OF PROPOSED POLICY AND FORMULA TO GUIDE ALLOCATION OF FIRM ELECTRIC ENERGY
AND SYSTEM RESERVE ENERGY FROM THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, 44
Fed. Reg. 57,824 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BPA POLICY REPORT].

91.

S. 885, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 3996 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979). See also

S. REP. No. 96-272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (to accompany S. 885); H.R. 6677, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H 1502 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1980).
92. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978), adding section 210 to Federal Power Act (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. 11 1978)).
93. Application of Northern States Power for a Certificate, No. CA-5447, Feb. 24, 1978.
94. In the Matter of the Participation of Southern California Edison Company and San

Diego Gas & Electric Company in the Proposed Kaiparowits Electric Generation Plant, No.

88005, Calif. PUC, Oct. 18, 1977, [1974-791 UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,511.
95. [1977-1978] Annual Report of the Western Interstate Energy Board 3-4.
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noted,9 6 a group of consuming states have brought an action in the United
States Supreme Court to invalidate the Louisiana First Use Tax. It is evident that lines are being drawn between the energy-producing and energyconsuming states.
B.

Water Po/icy and Energy

It is well recognized that sources of energy to displace both imported oil
and polluting coal could be furnished from the rivers of the West. Such a
use would be at the expense of the agricultural economy to which the waters
are presently committed under a property system known as "prior appropriation." Under this system, a property right can be created by the application of water to a beneficial use; the right 9is7 superior to those established
later, but junior to those established earlier.
The rights are transferable, and the markets now existing for them are
administered differently in each of the western states adhering to the doctrine. 98 In a simplified example, the owner of a water right connected with a
hydroelectric generating station might be limited by the nature of the water
right to operating the dam at less than its rated capacity in low water years
in order to meet the demands of downstream owners of senior water rights.
However, absent legislative constraints within the particular state, a power
company could purchase water rights either with or without land if the
value of the additional power justified it. When the cost of the electricity
acquired in this way (without new investment and without fuel costs) is compared with the price of that generated by new plants burning oil, it is apparent that even productive farm land might be retired to facilitate an energy
policy designed to reduce reliance on oil.
The federal government affirmatively encourages the installation of
generators at existing dam sites in the Northeast, where much of the production is oil-fired. There, however, the water rights system operates differently
than it does in the arid West. In the West, much of the electric power produced from water projects goes to metropolitan centers remote from the
mountainous regions where the water falls and is stored, and where the earlier water rights support the local economies. The political pressures to
maintain the agricultural economy based on these early water rights are very
strong.
Similar analyses can be made with respect to other kinds of energy
projects. In theory, the sponsor of a project to make a slurry of coal and to
transport it by pipeline to a generating station can assemble the required
water by purchasing existing rights alone or by purchasing the lands on
which they are used and retiring the lands from agricultural production.
The economics of the project might justify the purchase of substantial
amounts of agricultural land.
States use their police power to frustrate energy projects requiring
96. See note 28 supra.
97. See generally F. TRELEASE, WATER LAw 32-45, 92-99 (3d ed. 1979).
98. Compare CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1979) with MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 85-1-201 to -224 (1979).
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water. In Montana, for example, the legislature has said that using water for
slurry projects is not a "beneficial use." 99 Thus, the energy entrepreneur is
precluded from appropriating water initially and possibly from buying existing water rights. The constitutionality of this type of statute has not yet
been adjudicated. Colorado, as another example, specifically forbids the export of "Colorado" water. 0
The federal government's ownership of land in the public land states, 10 t
is the basis for an assertion made by the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior on June 25, 1979, that the federal government's rights to waters
needed to make full use of its own lands are superior to most of the stateadministered water rights perfected under state law.' 0 2 This is an extension
of the judicially recognized doctrine of "implied reservation" of water used
by the United States when it created Indian reservations, wildlife refuges,
national forests, and national parks; the water retained must be sufficient to
meet the needs of the federal preserve. The priority of the government's
right is established as of the date the land is reserved for federal purposes. 103
The Solicitor's opinion caused great consternation in the West, for it
cast a cloud on the existing property system. The threat was considered
most real in connection with the development of coal and oil shale on public
lands. Obviously, the federal government could realize a greater return from
leasing these water demanding projects if it could use its sovereign claims to
assure the supply of water necessary to complete them, without having to
pay for the value of the water rights "taken" by the process.
C.

Utility Regulatory Policies

It is traditional for each state to review applications for the construction
of utility facilities against the public convenience and the need for such facilities in the state. Where the facility is designed to serve the needs of the
residents of other states, a state can tax the plant's value. Under its police
04
power, it can also control pollution and regulate the siting process.1
California requires utilities seeking to locate a plant in another state to
secure a California certificate for the plant.' 0 5 Many applications for new
facilities are being resisted on the basis of an insufficient need for the plant's
99. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-2-104(2) (1979).
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1979).
101. Se note 3 supra.
102. 86 Interior Dec. 553, 564 (June 25, 1979).
103. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
104. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, however, a state may not impose a tax on the
generation or transmission of electricity which discriminates against out-of-state consumers or
sellers. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). Discrimination is defined as any tax which results in a greater
burden on interstate commerce than on intrastate commerce. Id. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), where the Supreme Court held a New Mexico tax on exported
electrical energy invalid under 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). In Arzona the Court also recognized
that generating electricity could result in environmental and other problems for the generating
state; it found no indication under § 391 that Congress intended to prohibit the states from
taxing the generation of electricity to pay for solutions to these problems. 441 U.S. at 150-51.
But the Court warned that the interstate and the intrastate customers would have to be taxed
equally. Id. at 151.
105. See note 94 supra.
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output in the particular state. Thus, the potential is created for acceptance
of a more expensive alternative site in a different state.
It may be necessary for federal preemptive legislation to break through
future impasses to assure conformance with national energy policies, such as
the policy to displace oil-fired electric generation with coal-fired generation.
From the revenue standpoint of states such as Montana or Wyoming, which
are rich in coal resources, utility regulatory policies could be manipulated to
assure cheaper power for the state's own requirements. For example, Wyoming power plants generate several times as much power as Wyoming customers consume, thereby assuring Wyoming residents of whatever advantage
there might be in scale. But, Wyoming also might condition the granting of
its certificates on the acceptance of valuation divisions charging a disproportionate share of facilities' costs to the out-of-state customers. At some point
this would be subject to an equal protection or commerce clause objection in
the courts,' 0 6 but the process is so amorphous that such an attack would not
be brought until the process was flagrantly abused.
Oregon has enacted legislation enabling its domestic and rural power
consumers to take advantage of the preference provisions in the Bonneville
legislation. 107 If other states in the Columbia Basin follow suit, California
could be deprived of the use of the two major high voltage entities between
the Pacific Northwest and Southwest because no excess power will be available for export.' 0 8

V.

EFFECT OF STATE MINERAL TAX POLICIES ON MINERAL
PRODUCTION AND ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Differentials traceable to the federal system or to state constitutional
principles involving tax immunity patterned after the federal system are
compounded by the variety and complexity of mineral tax policies among
the states. 10 9 Energy production is taxed through income taxes, property
taxes, severance taxes, and production taxes.110
It is virtually impossible to derive data on the effect of these taxes on
mineral production and energy resource development because they cannot
be analyzed in isolation. For example, even though an income tax compares
favorably with many other kinds of taxes on the mineral industry because it
is based on profitability, and it is neutral with respect to ore cut-off grades or
the classification of reserves, I 11 state-to-state comparisons are hampered because some states do not have income taxes;"12 other states have substantially different rates due to the deductibility or nondeductibility of federal
106. A similar argument might be raised with respect to proposals in Delaware and Georgia
to restrict the sale of shares of lower-cost electric generating facilities to out-of-state utilities. See
Electrical Week, Mar. 3, 1980, at 1.
107. 1977 Or. Laws ch. 888, §§ 1-44, reprinted in OR. REV. STAT. § 262.115 (1977) (note).
108. See generally BPA POLImC REPORT, supra note 90.
109. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 99-119.
110. Id. at 11.
Id.
Ill.
112. Wyoming and South Dakota, for example, do not impose personal or corporate income
taxes. Id. at 99.
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income taxes.i 3 Similarly, the use of income tax deductions to encourage4
'
mineral development, a practice which is common in the federal system,'
varies from state to state, making it difficult to analyze state tax policies with
any degree of accuracy. The same generalizations can be made concerning
property taxes. In addition to differentials among states in the methodology
for property tax valuation, there may be considerable variance within a state
owing to the autonomy of the assessors.
Severance taxes have the most easily identifiable effects on the economics of mineral production.' 15 Unit severance taxes differ from ad valorem
severance taxes. 116 A severance tax based on the net proceeds has effects
similar to an income tax.' '1 Severance taxes are also naturally nonneutral in
regard to resource allocation because mineral prices are increased in relation
to other prices to the extent that forward shifting is possible.' 11 Most relevant to this inquiry, however, is not their characteristic of nonneutrality but
their imposition on sources of energy as a means for exporting the tax to
consuming states. Also important, from an intergovernmental relations
standpoint, is the shift of the severance tax from a role of internalizing external costs to revenue-raising.
The following chart showing the pattern of mineral taxes in the selected
western states is instructive.' 9

VI.

ADMINISTRATION, COMPLIANCE AND INTERACTION

Studies have dealt with the steps states have taken to conform their
income tax statutes with the federal scheme to facilitate administration and
compliance.' 20 The program of deductions and credits for conservation expenditures, now written into federal law, has been rapidly copied at the state
level. 12i In the area of credits for gasohol, the states have moved ahead of
23
2 2
To the extent that it amounts to a subsidy,"
the federal government.'
113. Id. at 11.
114. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 611.
115. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 14-16. For a comparison of the effects of severance
taxes with those of income and property taxes, see id. at 11-14.
116. Id. at 15. A unit severance tax is a flat rate per unit of production, and an ad valorem
severance tax is a percentage value of production. The unit tax tends to discriminate against
low-grade ores while the ad valorem severance tax discriminates more against ores with high
mining costs (assuming quality is held constant). The burden of the unit tax decreases with
price increases and increases with price decreases, whereas the burden of the ad valorem tax
varies with product prices. Id.
117. Id.
118. Steele, Natural Resource Taxation: Resource Allocation and DiitributionImplications, in ExTRACTIVE RESOURCES AND TAXATION 247 (M.

Gaffney ed. 1967).

119. S. Blackstone, supra note 22, at 100.
120. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, Federal Collection ofState Indnidual Income Taxes, 1977 DUKE L.J.
59.
121.
STAT. §
122.
123.

H.B. 1264, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1980) (to be codified in COLO. REV.
39-22-128).
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 66-821 to -841 (Supp. 1979).
For a qualitative analysis of federal subsidies involving energy see U.S. DE'T OF EN-

ERGY, SELECTED FEDERAL TAX AND NON-TAX SUBSIDIES FOR ENERGY USE AND PRODUCTION
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the combination of federal and state tax exemptions or credits has been cal124
culated to be a substantial subsidy.
The windfall profit tax 125 illustrates another important aspect of intergovernmental relations. To the extent that the tax allows the payment of
state taxes on production as a cost, states will be able to tax oil enterprises
without affecting the cost of production. There is likely to be political pressure in each state to take advantage of this "free" revenue.
As structured, the new law continues a shadow price control system to
serve as the beginning or measuring point of that part of the realization of a
26
The displaced price
producer that is "windfall" and subject to the tax.1
control system was complex, and prior to the enactment of the windfall
12 7
profit tax the program was administered by the Department of Energy.
The compliance and enforcement process now will move to the Internal
Revenue Service. 128 Consequently, the transactional costs, particularly to
small producers, will probably increase.
CONCLUSION

It is evident that the utmost care must attend any effort to generalize
about federal-state relationships, uniformity among the states or even within
a particular state, taxes or tax-like effects on energy mineral production, or
energy conversion. The beginning of reform, assuming reform is needed at
all, is comprehension of the existing situation which is staggering in its complexity. The energy market has previously adjusted to the labyrinthine federal system and presumably will adjust to it in the future, although it will
suffer the costs associated with uncertainty. The problem of coordinating
the interests of the so-called consuming states and the producing states is not
129
new; many cases have dealt with it in the past.
The complexities of policy development in a federal structure are illustrated in energy policy development. The federal government's leasing policies are not integrated with its taxing policies and probably will not be. The
conflicting objectives and the overlapping jurisdictional considerations impede the effort to construct a national policy. Taxes and tax-like effects of
leasing and sales of public lands and resources must be understood if any
progress is to be made.
The federal government faces no practical constitutional obstacle in
passing legislation that would eliminate or tend to eliminate some of the
situations previously identified. The Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions support legislation like that introduced to put a cap on the
124. R. Crow, The Effect of Use Taxes and Conservation Oriented Tax Incentives on Energy Markets (1980) (unpublished paper on file with Professor Carver).
125. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998.
126. Id. § 4988(a).
127. S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprznted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1073.

128. Id. at 68, reprintedzi [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1075.
129. See, e.g., FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
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states' severance taxes.' 30 Moreover, the federal government could legislatively invalidate Louisiana's First Use Tax. 3 1 It could also remove the exemption of municipal bond interest from federal individual income tax
liability. Federal income tax deductions for state gasoline tax payments
t 32
have already been eliminated.
The likelihood that any or all of these things will happen is slim, but it
may be growing. Clearly, the federal government cannot permit frustration
of its energy programs-a frustration which is all too possible.

130. See S. 1778, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 13,017 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1979)
(limits state severance taxes on energy resources produced from Indian lands or lands owned by
the United States to 12-1/2%). On Aug. 5, 1980, the National Governor's Conference adopted a
resolution endorsing the right of coal-producing states to impose "reasonable" coal severance
taxes. INGAA Washington Report, No. 974, at 9 (Aug. 8, 1980).
131. Congress could invalidate the Louisiana First Use Tax by the same process that it used
to invalidate the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax, that is, by passing legislation that would
expressly prohibit such a tax. See note 104 supra.
132. See I.R.C. § 164.

